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1 INTRODUCTION 
When the Dutch government wants to initiate a new public project, if often has 
to buy land from citizens. In cases like these, the citizen in question and the 
government face a situation of bilateral monopoly and the price the government 
has to pay in exchange for the ownership of the land depends on the bargaining 
power of tile two agents. This paper focuses on the price the Dutch government 
pays to farmers in situations in which land of several farmers is bought in order 
to create a new public project (as a highway, or a recreation area - as explained 
in e.g. Visser, 1994). 
Situations of bilateral monopoly between the government and a citizen in 
which the government wants to obtain (part of) the property of the citizen occur 
so often that the Dutch law specifies a procedure the government has to follow. 
The law also determines tiaat in case of disagreement about the price of land, the 
court decides what the price of the land will be. Given this legal framework, a 
natural setting in which to analyze the bargaining problem is an asymmetric in- 
formation model in which the government makes a number of sequential price 
offers to the farmers (whose private valuations are unknown to the government) 
before it goes to court. 
Starting from Rubinstein (1982) there has been a rapidly growing non-coop- 
erative game theoretic literature in which the offers (and counter-offers) of the 
bargaining parties are explicitly modelled as sequential moves. The literature that 
is closest to the situation we want to analyze in this paper has two features: 
(i) one party makes a finite number of sequential offers and the other party can 
only accept or reject these offers and (ii) the party that makes the offers is un- 
informed about the private valuation of the other party. Examples of this type of 
model include a durable good monopolist setting prices in a market in which it 
does not know the different consumers' willingness to pay (see e.g. Stokey, 1981 
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and Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991: pp. 400-416) and a union, making sequential 
wage offers to a firm whose profitability is unknown to the union (see e.g. 
Gibbons, 1992: pp. 218-224). Generally speaking, the above literature has yielded 
two relatively robust conclusions. First, most equilibria show a 'skimming prop- 
erty,' which means that high-valuation agents accept price offers before low-valu- 
ation agents. Second, some equilibria of these models exhibit what is called 
'Coasian dynamics,' i.e. price offers decline over time. Another interesting prop- 
erty is that the monopoly power of the party that makes the offers disappears if it 
can make offers arbitrarily fast (see e.g. Gul et al., 1986). This property is some- 
times referred to as the Coase conjecture. For a recent survey on bargaining with 
private information the reader is referred to Kennan and Wilson (1993). 
The structure of the model that we will present is, from a mathematical point 
of view, equivalent to models that are studied in the above mentioned literature; 
in particular see Fudenberg and Tirole (1983) and Sobel and Takahashi (1983). 
The main difference is that in our case, the party who makes the offers (the 
government) is the buyer of the product (land), whereas in the earlier literature it 
is the seller (the monopolist or the union) who makes the offers. Consequently, 
as we will see, the skimming property and (in the case most commonly consid- 
ered) the Coasian dynamics property are reversed. 
Due to the fact that administrative procedures and the Dutch law determine a
procedure that has to be followed our model is not subject o some of the criti- 
cisms that are launched against he non-cooperative bargaining literature. A first 
point of critique is that the outcome of the model is very sensitive to the as- 
sumed structure of offers and counter-offers. In many applications there seems to 
be no good reason to assume a particular structure of offers and counter-offers. 
We will see that in our case the structure of offers is determined by the Dutch 
law insisting that the government should have made enough attempts to come to 
a settlement by agreement. Second, in many models it is not clear why there is a 
finite number of bargaining rounds (cf. the monopoly case) and/or what happens 
when the bargaining is over and no offer is accepted (cf  the union case). As the 
Dutch law specifies that the government can go to court after having followed a 
specific administrative procedure that takes approximately three years, this cri- 
tique also does not bear to our situation to the same degree. Third, as we will 
see, there are good reasons to believe that at the end of the bargaining process 
the government cannot make offers arbitrarily fast. This means that administra- 
tive procedures and the Dutch law can be regarded as commitment devices that 
make it possible for the government to benefit o some extent from its monopoly 
power. 1 When discussing the legal framework and the way we have modelled the 
bargaining situation, we will discuss these points in more depth. 
1 In this respect i might be interesting tonote that a common point of view is that democratic 
governments have problems in making binding commitments (see e.g. Stiglitz, 1989). The case con- 
sidered here might be regarded as a counterexample to this claim. 
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Casual empiricism 2 suggests two interesting phenomena bout the bargaining 
process between the government and farmers in The Netherlands. First, almost 
all cases are solved via a settlement by agreement between the parties, i.e. the 
mere threat of a decision by court is enough to come to an agreement. Second, in 
some cases all farmers accept he first offer by the government; in other cases the 
government has to make several offers before all farmers accept. Both observa- 
tions can be explained by our model. The conditions under which each of these 
situations (including the few situations that appear in court) applies is fully char- 
acterized. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes ome institutional facts 
in which the bargaining process takes place. The legal rules can be interpreted as 
the rules of the game. Section 3 uses the information of section 2 to formulate 
the model. The game theoretic analysis is carried out in section 4. In this section 
we will also see to what extend our model exhibits properties as the skimming 
property, Coasian dynamics and the Coase conjecture. Section 5 summarizes the 
principal findings and concludes the paper. A formal proof of the main proposi- 
tion is given in the Appendix. 
2 THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 3 
Before the government (read: local authorities, the city council, and so on) can 
bring the case to court three conditions have to be fulfilled: (i) there must be a 
legally valid blue-print ('bestemmingsplan') of the area, (ii) an administrative pro- 
cedure, resulting in a final offer, must have been followed and (iii) the govern- 
ment should have made serious attempts to obtain the ground via a settlement by 
agreement. We will describe ach of these conditions in more detail below before 
describing the legal phase of the procedure itself. 
The changing of the blue-print usually takes three to four years and can be 
divided in the following three steps. First, the plan must be made and published 
so that the opponents can bring in their petitions ('bezwaarschriften'). Second, 
the (possibly) revised plan must be published and another ound of petitions fol- 
lows. Finally, the definite plan must be approved so that it has legal force. 
The administrative procedure takes approximately three years. The procedure 
starts with a topological sketch of the area and a conditional plan of expropria- 
tion. The plan is published and opponents can bring in their petitions. The (re- 
vised) expropriation plan is made and published and the final offer for the land 
owners is prepared. This offer is published in the Official Gazette ('Staatscou- 
rant'). If the owner does not accept he offer, the government can go to court and 
the offer is repeated at the citation. 
2 Part of our observations are based on conversations with employees of 'recreatieschap Midden 
Delfland,' a group of civil servants who are actively engaged in the expropriation process. 
3 The following is based on Berenschot (1970). 
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While the administrative procedure takes place the government tries to obtain 
the land via a settlement by agreement ('minnelijke schikking'). The results of 
these informal negotiations are presented to the mayor. If an agreement has been 
reached this will be implemented. If no agreement is reached, the city and pro- 
vincial councils discuss the issue and they bring out the final offer discussed in 
the previous paragraph. The time between the last (informal) offer and the final 
offer is approximately one year. 
The process in court is relatively straightforward (from an economics point of 
view). At the start of the legal process, the owners of the land receive a sum- 
mons to appear ('dagvaarding') and experts are asked to give an estimation of 
the price of the land. The process itself might take up to two or three years. The 
final sentence is based on the expert's report. The sentence determines the com- 
pensation payment (price) of the land. If the compensation payment is lower than 
or equal to the final offer that appeared in the Official Gazette, then the owner of 
the land is sentenced to pay the costs of the law suit, including the expenses of 
the experts. If the compensation payment the court determines i higher than the 
final offer by the government, hen the government has to pay for the costs of 
the law suit. For simplicity, and for the simple fact that we rarely observe this 
happening in reality, we neglect he possibility of an appeal in cassation. 
It should be noted that although the changing of the blue-print and the admin- 
istrative procedure are legally completely independent of each other, usually they 
are started at the same moment in time. In most cases, the government initiates 
an informal procedure to settle by agreement. This informal procedure also takes 
place simultaneously with the official procedure and should have finished before 
the case can be brought o court. 
3 THE MODEL 
In the game theoretic analysis of the situation described in section 2 we assume 
that the administrative procedure and the informal procedure to get a settlement 
by agreement take place at the same moment in time. We will first present a 
basic model and subsequently ook at an extended model. In the basic model, the 
government G is assumed to make two price offers: a first offer pf and a final (or 
secondary) offer Ps. The first price offer can be considered as a simple represen- 
tation of the informal negotiations described in the previous section. In the ex- 
tension, we consider the effects of introducing many (informal) offers. An offer is 
assumed to be an overall price for the whole property. 4 The farmers can only 
accept or reject the offer, but cannot make a counter-offer. If the offer is rejected, 
one year passes before a new (final) offer is prepared. When the second offer is 
4 Alternatively, one could assume that he offer is a price per hectare. As the cost of the trial C are 
independent of the size of the farm, this will create adifference between small and large farms. Apart 
from this difference, the qualitative r sults of the analysis below will continue to hold. 
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also rejected, a trial is automatically started. The procedure that leads to the final 
blue-print of the area is not explicitly modelled. It is simply assumed that the 
blue-print has been prepared in the period the bargaining takes place and is valid 
in law when a trial is started. 
The outcome of the trial is unknown to the government and the farmer and 
formally represented in the following simple way. A farmer wins (looses) the trial, 
if the compensation payment he gets in court is higher than (lower than or equal 
to) Ps. For simplicity, the outcome of the trial is represented by a move by na- 
ture. With a probability of q, nature chooses a high compensation payment, 
pH>ps, and with a probability of 1-q a low compensation payment, pL<--ps. 5
Note that the farmer eceives a lower price for his property in court than the last 
price offer by the government if PL < Ps- The costs of the trial are denoted by C 
and the party that loses the trial has to pay these costs. 
The farmers' cost of giving up their land equals the discounted expected fu- 
ture income stream. The discount factor is denoted by 6 and assumed to be iden- 
tical for the two types of farmers and the government. The private valuation of 
their property depends on the type of farmer. In informal gatherings, civil ser- 
vants (see footnote 2) usually distinguish two types of farmers, namely 'hobby' 
farmers and 'real' farmers. We simply follow this practice. A 'real' farmer ex- 
pects to earn x R per year and the 'hobby' farmer expects to earn an income of x H 
per year. Assuming that the farmer could have earned x R or xt_/, respectively, for 
many years ahead, the-'real' farmer's cost of giving up his land, denoted by CRF, 
can be approximated by xR/(1-~ ) and the 'hobby' farmer's cost of giving up his 
land, which is denoted by C~/F, can be approximated by xn/(1-3). Following the 
same logic, the cost of giving up the land one year later is equal to 6xR/(1-6 ),
or 6CRF and ~Cuv respectively. The percentage of 'real' farmers among the farm- 
ers whose land will be bought is given by cc The present value of the land to the 
government is represented by V. It is assumed that V> CRr, i.e., there are gains 
from trade. 
The basic model, which is represented in extensive form in Figure 1, contains 
three stages. In stage 1, which lasts one year, the first offer is made and accepted 
or rejected. In stage 2, which also lasts one year, the second price offer is made 
and accepted or rejected. Finally, in stage 3, there is a possibility of a trial. A 
trial takes three years. The agents are assumed to maximize their discounted ex- 
pected pay-offs, i.e. the farmers try to get the highest price possible, while the 
government attempts to get the lowest price possible. The model is common 
knowledge. The only thing the government does not know is to what type of 
farmer it makes a price offer. 
5 A more realistic way of modelling the outcome of the trial is that he probability he government 
wins the trial positively depends on the last offer it made. This can be easily accomplished byrep- 
resenting nature's move by a continuous density function instead of by a discrete one. This, however, 
would only add technical complications. 
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Figure 1 - Payoffs to Government and farmer, respectively 
Apart from the informal negotiations that occur before the final offer is made, 
the basic model provides a relatively accurate description of the main ingredients 
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of the procedure described in section 2. In the extended model, the first price 
offer is replaced by an arbitrary number of informal offers; represented by 
p~ ..... pin. In order to compare the pay-off of informal offer p~, j=2,...,n, with p~ 
we introduce a discount factor ~', where (6')n=5. The price offer py, is the last 
informal offer the government makes. If this offer is rejected, one year passes 
before the second offer Ps is made. The time between two subsequent informal 
offers can be arbitrarily fast. Formally, this means that n can be very large and 
that ~' will be close to 1. In the next section we will show that the qualitative 
results of the basic model carry over to the extended model, which better de- 
scribes the procedure given in section 2. 
Both the basic and the extended model can be interpreted in two ways. A first 
interpretation is that the government bargains with only one farmer, but it does 
not know what type of farmer ('real' or 'hobby') it bargains with. Here, c~ repre- 
sents the government's prior belief of having to do with a 'real' farmer. Another 
interpretation is that the government bargains with many farmers at the same time, 
but that at any point in time it has to make (for example, for reasons of fairness 
or because of anti-discrimination laws) the same price offer to each farmer who 
has not yet accepted a previous offer. Here, c~ represents the fraction of 'real' 
farmers in the farmer population. In this latter interpretation the civil servants 
who bargain on behalf of the government cannot use information with respect o 
the type of farmer they are negotiating with, i.e. they cannot condition their price 
on the type of farmer, because they are forced to set the same price for everyone 
(see above). 
4 ANALYSIS 
In this section we will analyze which combination of price offers will be made 
and accepted. In order to do this we employ the concept of a perfect Bayes-Nash 
equilibrium. 6 The formal analysis of the game is given in the Appendix. Here, 
we will discuss the results in a more informal way. The notion of a perfect Bayes- 
Nash equilibrium adds two elements to the standard notion of a Nash equilib- 
rium. First, the player's beliefs are updated using Bayes' rule (when applicable). 
In the context of the present model, this means that when making its second of- 
fer the government has more information (contained in the acceptance and/or re- 
jection of the first offer) about he probability of having to do with a 'real' farmer 
than at the start of the game. It is optimal for the government to use this extra 
information. Second, the perfection requirement implies that at every information 
set the players' actions should be optimal (even at the ones that will not be 
6 In the formal analysis players can choose mixed strategies. A mixed strategy in the present con- 
text can be best rationalized in the second interpretation of the model, i.e. the one in which the govern- 
ment bargains with many farmers at the same time. The mixed strategy can then be interpreted asthe 
percentage of a particular type of farmer accepting the offer. 
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reached given the strategies the players have chosen). This implies that the analy- 
sis of the game can start by analyzing the behaviour of the players at the last 
information sets. By looking at the last decision nodes of the 'real' and the 
'hobby' farmer in the game tree in Figure 1 it becomes clear that the two types 
of farmers will accept ps if, and only if, 
Ps - C,~F > 63 [q(Pi-1 -- CRF) + (1 -- q) (PL -- CRF -- C)] (1) 
for the 'real' farmer and 
Ps - CHF> 63 [q(Pi~ -- C ,y )  + (1 - q)(PL - Cnv-- C)] (2) 
for the 'hobby' farmer. If these inequalities are not satisfied, the farmers are bet- 
ter off, in expected terms, to reject the second price offer and go to court. 
Looking at the last information set of the government reveals that the govern- 
ment will only make price offers ps that satisfy the following inequality: 
V-  ps> 63 [q (V-  p , -  C) + (1 - q) (V -  pr)]. (3) 
If this inequality is not satisfied the government is, in expected terms, better off 
by going to court. (As it is assumed that the government will immediately start a 
legal process once the second offer is rejected, it is implied that the R.H.S. of 
equation (3) is positive.) 
Before stating the proposition, it is helpful to introduce the concepts of pool- 
ing and separating equilibrium. The equilibrium is pooling if the equilibrium price 
offers, denoted by (p},p~), are such that both types of farmers either accept p} or 
accept Ps, i.e. both types of farmers choose the same actions; the equilibrium is 
(fully) separating if the two types of farmers choose different actions, e.g. the 
hobby farmer accepts p} for sure and the 'real' farmer rejects p} for sure; the 
equilibrium is partially separating if the hobby farmer randomizes with positive 
probability between accepting p} and accepting p~ and the real farmer accepts 
Ps for sure. 
Proposition. The unique perfect Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the game is 
pooling if ot(V--C~F)>(CRF--CHF ) and it is (partially) separating if 
< (cRy- 
The proof of the proposition is given in the Appendix. Here, we will only 
provide the basic intuition of the proof and indicate some interesting features of 
the equilibrium price offers. In order to do so it is convenient to rewrite equa- 
tions (1)-(3) as (1')-(3'): 
Ps > 83 [q(PH - PL + C) + PL - CRF -- C)] + CRF (1') 
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Ps > 63 [q(P~r- PL + C) +Pc - CHv -- C)] + CHF (2') 
P~ > 63 [q (PH - PL + C) + Pc - V)] + V (3') 
For later reference we will define p f  and ps H as the R.H.S. of equations (1') and 
(2'), respectively. As V > CRF > CHF, the R.H.S. of equation (3') is larger than 
pf,  which in turn is larger than ps H. This means that the government can always 
choose Ps such that both types of farmers will accept and such that it is better off 
with the settlement by agreement than by going to court, i.e. there are gains from 
trade. Two other critical values are the lowest price offers a 'real' and a 'hobby' 
farmer would accept in the first stage. These values are denoted by p](p,) and 
P~(Ps) and are defined as: 
Pf(Ps) = max {~ps R + (1 - 6)CRF, 6ps + (1 - 8)CRF } 
H py (ps) = max {Spy + (1 - 3)CHF, 8p, + (1 -- 3)CHF } 
(4) 
(5) 
The intuition behind equations (4) and (5) is that a farmer will only accept he 
first price offer, if his expected pay-off of doing so is larger than the expected 
pay-off of either accepting the second offer or of going to court. Note that 
PT(Ps) and P~(Ps) depend on Pr  
One of the properties of related models is the skimming property referred to in 
the Introduction. In a dynamic monopoly setting, this property indicates that 
'high-valuation' buyers accept price offers before 'low-valuation' buyers do, We 
will now check whether a similar property also holds in the context of our model. 
As the government is the buyer of the property and not the seller (as in the usual 
monopoly case) one would expect the skimming property to be reversed. The 
following observations with respect o the above four critical values are useful in 
this respect: 
(i) _n > _,~ (by comparing the R.H.S. of equations (1') and (2')); P's IJs 
(ii) Vps, PT(P,) >p}t(p~) (by comparing equations (4) and (5) above); 
The two observations together show that a reverse skimming property holds in 
our model: at any point in time it will not be the case that real farmers, which 
are the 'high-valuation' agents of our model, accepted a price offer, while hobby 
farmers did not. 
By means of these two observations, the proof of the theorem identifies three 
possible equilibrium price offer configurations. Each of these equilibria is unique 
in a particular ange of parameter values. 
(a) (p;,p;) = ( pf + (1 - 6) CRy, Pf), 
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(b) (p},p*~) = (Sp~ + (1 - 8) CHF, p~), 
(c) (p},p~) = (Sp"~ + (1 - 8 )c , ,~ ,p~.  
In case (a) both hobby farmers and real farmers accept he first offer. In case (b) 
all hobby farmers accept he first offer for sure and the real farmers accept he 
second offer for sure. In case (c) hobby farmers reject the first offer with a cer- 
tain positive probability and accept he second price offer with the complement 
probability; the real farmers reject both offers for sure. 
A second property of related models is the Coasian price dynamics property, 
which we also briefly mentioned in the Introduction. In a dynamic monopoly set- 
ting, this property says that a monopolist's price offers will decline over time. By 
investigating the equilibrium price offers in the above three cases we can check 
whether a similar property also holds in the context of our model. Note that for 
the same reason as above when discussing the skimming property one would ex- 
pect our model to exhibit reverse Coasian price dynamics if any. It is easy to see 
that in all three cases price offers increase, i.e. ps<<-p~, if both CRp<-pf and 
CHv <-pf. These last two inequalities in turn hold when the expected value of 
going to court for both real and hobby farmers, q(pn--CRv)+(1--q)(PL--CRF--C ) 
and q(pH--CHF)+(1--q)(PL--CHF--C), respectively are nonnegative. This is the 
case most commonly focused upon in the literature on bargaining with asymmet- 
ric information. In our case, however, there is no particular reason to expect hese 
expected values to be nonnegative and, correspondingly, p] may be larger than 
p;. 
Case (a) is a pooling equilibrium, case (b) is a separating equilibrium and case 
(c) is a partially separating equilibrium. As the government makes the price of- 
fers, the government can choose which of the three types of equilibria will come 
about. In the Appendix it is shown that the government chooses to make offers 
such that the pooling equilibrium comes out if a(V--CnF ) > (CRF--CHF). In or- 
der to understand this conditions intuitively, let us look at the impact of the pa- 
rameters o~, V and (CRF--CHF) in determining whether the equilibrium is pooling 
or separating. The main difference, from the government's point of view, between 
a separating and a pooling equilibrium is that in the former the government's first 
offer is lower than in the latter. Off-setting this advantage of a separating equi- 
librium is the fact that the discounted expected pay-off the government receives 
from obtaining the land from the 'real' farmers is larger under a pooling than 
under a separating equilibrium. Pulling in the direction of a separating equilib- 
rium are then: 
(i) A relatively low value of a. The larger the fraction of the population 
of farmers (the 'hobby' farmers) that can be offered a relatively low 
first price offer, the more the government benefits from it. 
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(ii) A relatively low value of V. The lower the subjective valuation of the 
government, the less the government is interested in obtaining all the 
land in the first stage. 
(iii) A relatively large difference CRF--Cz_IF. The larger this difference, the 
larger the difference in first price offers between potential pooling and 
separating equilibria. 
The model also explains the observation that only a few cases end up in court. A 
case will end up in court if a farmer rejects both price offers. Above we have 
seen that in equilibrium (a) and (b) both types of farmers accept one of the two 
offers. This means that in these two equilibria no case will end up in court. In 
equilibrium (c) the 'real' farmers, but not the 'hobby' farmers, reject both price 
offers. In the Appendix, we compare the pay-offs of equilibria (b) and (e). The 
calculations reveal that the government's pay-off of equilibrium (c) is higher, if 
and only if, a is small. Recall that in the second interpretation f the model men- 
tioned at the end of section 3, c~ represents he percentage of 'real' farmers in the 
population of farmers. Thus, equilibrium (c) will occur only if there are relatively 
few 'real' farmers and only these few farmers will reject both price offers (and 
only in this equilibrium configuration). This is why we claim that our model ex- 
plains why only a few cases end up in court. The intuition for this result is the 
same as above: from the point of view of the government the advantage of case 
(c) over case (b) is that the 'hobby' farmers receive a lower price. This advan- 
tage outweighs the disadvantage of a lower pay-off obtained from the expropria- 
tion of the 'real' farmers only if there are relatively few 'real' farmers, i.e. only 
if c~ is small. 
Extensions of the model. In the extended model we consider a modification of 
the basic model in which the government can make many offers in the beginning 
of the bargaining process. The main aim of the extended model is to consider the 
impact of the possibility of making offers arbitrarily fast (in the informal nego- 
tiations) on the monopoly power of the government concerned. In the Introduc- 
tion we mentioned that the Coase conjecture says that the monopoly power of a 
monopolist disappears in a dynamic environment if it can change prices arbi- 
trarily fast. We will argue here that the Coase conjecture does not hold in our 
model. In order to show this, we will first provide the main intuition why the 
Coase conjecture holds in some existing models (see e.g. Gul et al., 1986). Sub- 
sequently, we will show what the impact is of allowing arbitrarily fast offers in 
the beginning of the bargaining process between the government and the farmers 
in our model. Finally, we will compare the intuition for our result with the Coase 
conjecture. 
The main idea behind the Coase conjecture is nicely explained in Tirole (1988, 
pp. 80-87). He first considers a two-period monopoly model and shows that the 
monopolist charges lower prices in both periods compared to the standard single 
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period monopoly model. The reason is that in the two-period model a profit-maxi- 
mizing monopolist will flood the market in the second period by charging a rela- 
tively low price. However, as consumers can predict his behaviour, they will de- 
mand less in the first period and postpone some of their consumption until the 
second period. The resulting decrease in demand in the first period forces the 
monopolist o charge lower prices in the first period too. When there are (infi- 
nitely) many periods and when the length between the periods is very small, this 
problem takes on an extreme form: the monopolist looses all its monopoly power. 
The main reason for this phenomenon is that there are hardly any costs for the 
consumer to wait with his purchases until the next period when the length of a 
period becomes arbitrarily small. 
Let us then turn to the extension of our model in which the government can 
make informal offers arbitrarily fast in the beginning of the bargaining process. 
For any number of informal offers n, the perfect equilibrium price offers 
(p'~,...,p'~,p;) can be determined by using backward induction. It is clear that by 
setting p~ and p'~ equal to the basic model's equilibrium values Pl and Ps, re- 
spectively, the government can make at least as large a pay-off as it could in the 
basic model. The earlier price offers P~,...,P'~-I only provide a possibility to the 
government to make its pay-offs even larger. Thus, the monopoly power of the 
government does not diminish if we allow for arbitrarily fast offers during the 
informal negotiation process. 
The reason why our model does not confirm the Coase conjecture is that the 
latter holds true only when (i) the time lag between any two offers is arbitrary 
small and (ii) the bargaining process can go on indefinitely. The reason for the 
fact that both conditions do not hold in the situation we analyzed is that (i) the 
government eeds enough time (approximately one year) to prepare the offer that 
appears in the Official Gazette, i.e. the time lag between any two offers is not 
arbitrarily small and (ii) the Dutch law provides the government with the option 
of starting a legal process after three years, i.e. the bargaining process cannot go 
on indefinitely. These two conditions make it possible for the government to ex- 
ploit some of its monopoly power. 
5 CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have analyzed the possibilities the Dutch government has to 
expropriate land from its citizens in order to initiate public projects. It turned out 
that the laws that apply to situations of expropriation i The Netherlands are so 
strict that they provide quite specific indications for the rules of the bargaining 
game between the two parties. The game theoretic analysis of the model that is 
presented provides an explanation for the observations that almost all cases of 
expropriation result in a settlement by agreement and that in some cases the first 
offer by the government is accepted, while in other cases several offers are made 
before all, or most, farmers accept. 
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Proof. The proof first proceeds by looking at the government's optimal behaviour 
in the last period. Let tx(ps) be the government's a sessment of the percentage of 
real farmers in the population of farmers that has not accepted the first price of- 
fer. It is clear that the government's optimal price offer in the second period is 
either p~ or p~, or randomizing over p~and Ps. The pay-off of choosing p~= 
ps R is V-p~ and the pay-off of choosing p,=pM s is equal to (1-tx(ps))(V-p~. 
Therefore, the optimal strategy for the government in the second period is given 
by: 
Ps = [ pf  if/x(pf) > ~ p f  if/./. (pf) < g 
any randomization between p f  and p~/f /x (p s) = 
where g (p f  - p~/ (V-  p~.  As P~(Ps) > P~(Ps), tx(pf) can take on three values: 
(a) If both types of farmers accept Ps for sure,/x(ps) is indeterminate; (b) if hobby 
farmers accept Ps for sure and real farmers reject with a positive probability, 
/x(ps)= 1; (c) hobby farmers randomize between accepting and rejecting the first 
offer and the real farmers reject it, c~ __-/x(ps) < 1. 
(a) Both types of farmers accept py for sure if, and only if, pF>8 
pf+(1--6)CRF. Maximizing expected pay-offs means that the government should 
set pf as small as possible, which results in an expected pay-off of approximately 
V--SpRs--(1--8)CRF . 
(b) If ~(py) = 1, it is optimal for the government to set Ps equal to ps R. In order 
for/x(py) to be equal to 1, i.e. all hobby farmers accept py for sure and real farm- 
ers reject py with positive probability, Ps should be larger than or equal to 
psR+(1--6)CHF. Maximizing pay-offs then implies that the government offers 
(peP~)=(6psR+(1- ~3)CHF, psR). 7 This combination of price offers gives the govern- 
ment an expected pay-off of o~6(U-p~) + ( 1 - oe). (V -  6p~- ( 1 - 6) CHF). 
(c) In this case, we first concentrate on a < ~(Ps) < 1, i.e. the 'hobby' farmers 
choose to accept py with a probability strictly between 0 and 1. Let this probabil- 
ity be denoted by Y(Ps)" In order for the 'hobby' farmers to randomize, they have 
to be indifferent to either accepting Ps or accepting Pc, i.e. the equilibrium values 
7 Note that as CRF > CHF the 'real' farmers will not accept py Note also that when some real farm- 
ers reject he first offer with positive probability when the two offers (Ps,P,) are exactly equal to 
(~pR-b( I - -~)CRF  , pRs) , the government gets a strictly smaller pay-off than in case (a). So, this com- 
bination cannot be optimal. 
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of p¢ and Ps, denoted by p¢ and p,, respectively, have to be such that ps=~ 
p2+(1--6)Cs_IF. There are two generic subcases: /x (ps )>g and /x (p , )<g.  In the 
first case, the optimal p,  is equal to pff and the separating equilibrium considered 
under (b) comes about. 
Let us then consider the other case. Here, the optimal Ps equals pff. In order 
for/x(ps) to be smaller than ~, it must be the case that 
O~ 
~(Ps) (1 - y(ps))(1 - a) + o~ 
i.e. Y(Ps) < 1--a(1---~)/(1--a)-fi. A necessary condition to enable this is a<g.  
The expected pay-off of the government is then equal to y (1 -a ) -  
[V-  6p~- (1 - 8)CI_IF ] + 8(1 -- y)(1 -- a)[V--p~ + 84a[q(V-pi •- C) + (1 - q)(V--PL)]. 
Finally, let us consider the case in which no farmer accepts p~ i.e., the case 
/X(ps)=a. Again we consider two subcases, a > g and a < g,  and show that for 
each of these two cases the expected pay-off of the government is smaller than 
the expected pay-off of case (a), respectively, case (c). If a > p~, the optimal Ps 
equals pff and the expected pay-off of the government is 8(V-pR,). As V > C~/v it 
is easily seen that this pay-off is smaller than V--~pns--(l--~)CHF, the pay-off 
under case (a). If a < ~, the optimal ps equals pff and the expected pay-off of 
the government is 6(1--a)(V--p~+64ol[q(V--pH--C)+(1--q)(V--pL)]. Again, as 
V > CHF, it is easy to see that this pay-off is smaller than the pay-off under case 
(c). Thus, the government will never set Ps such that no farmer will accept it. 
Case (a) is a pooling situation, case (b) is a separating situation and case (c) 
is partially separating. A pooling equilibrium comes about if the pay-off of the 
government in such a situation is larger than the pay-off of the two (partially) 
separating situations. The pay-off under (a) is larger than the pay-off under (b) if 
V -  6pff - (1 - 6)CRF> a~(V-p~)  + (1 - a ) (V -  6p ff - (1 - 6)CHF). 
This inequality can be rewritten as a(V--C~,F)> (CRF--CHF). We still have to 
show that case (c) does not yield a larger expected pay-off than case (b) if 
oz(V--CuF ) > (CRF--CuF). This is done by showing that the necessary condition 
for case (c) to be relevant, a < ~, cannot be satisfied if a(V-  CHF ) > (CRF-- CHF ). 
This claim is true if 
_ _ pfx  - p fx  V - CI4F 
tz-- < 
V - pffx CRy -- CHF 
This is the case if (1--63)(V--Cnv)<(V--p~, which is equivalent to 
V > qpH+(1--q)(Pr--C). Due to the requirement that the R.H.S. of equation (3) 
is positive this inequality holds true. 
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The same argument shows that a separating equilibrium comes about if 
o~(V--CHF ) < (CRF-Ct_IF). Unicity simply follows from the sequential nature of 
the game. 
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Summary 
THE PRICE OF LAND AND THE PROCESS OF EXPROPRIATION 
This paper applies a game theoretic model to situations in which the Dutch government expropriates 
land from some farmers in order to create a new public project. The model is a version of a finite 
period bargaining model with asymmetric nformation and one-sided offers. It is shown that the model 
can explain some casual observations a  the fact that usually, but not always, the government and the 
farmers ettle by agreement. 
